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ABSTRACT: The primary question examined in this study is whether
client loans grow or stagnate over time. Loan growth is important to
financial sustainability and is also a proxy for positive impact. The
relationship between loan growth and a variety of factors—program
loan and savings policies, site selection, membership dynamics—are
explored in the context of seven village bank programs. The study concludes that on average, loan size did not stagnant but increased
steadily, although at a rate lower than the original village bank model
projections. Only programs that allowed non-poverty level loans
(loans above US$300) approached the original loan growth rate. Other
factors positively associated with more rapid loan growth were urban
site selection and restricted internal fund policies. Membership turnover—influx of new clients and drop-out of original clients—was also
evident across all programs, dampening loan growth rates by approximately 25%. While factors external to the program affect these dynamics, program policies can play an important role in stemming the
drop-out rate. In early loan cycles, initial program promotion and orientations need to clearly articulate program requirements and terms.
In later loan cycles, policies pertaining to savings access, meeting frequency, and membership requirements may require flexing to enhance
clients’ incentives to remain.
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Introduction
The primary question examined in this study is whether client loans
grow or stagnate over time. Village bank programs are established
with the ultimate goal of reducing poverty and raising the income
and quality of life of their clientele. The ability of borrowers to
work and to repay progressively larger loans is a proxy indicator for
the viability of loan activities and poverty alleviation at the client
level. To accomplish these impact goals, programs recognize the
need for financially sustainable operations. Financial sustainability
of village bank programs presumes a declining cost per dollar loaned
as members’ loans grow and as new clientele join existing banks.
Therefore, if loan sizes are indeed stagnating, it is important to
understand why. The questions below set forth specific areas of
study in relation to loan-size growth:
1.

What is the average loan size in practice versus the original
model developed by FINCA International president John
Hatch, and what are the key factors affecting loan-size growth?

2.

Does program location—urban versus rural—affect loan-size
growth?

3.

What is the actual savings rate in practice versus the original
Hatch model? What key factors affect borrower savings and
how do borrower savings affect average loan size?

4.

What are the actual membership dynamics (dropout, drop-in,
and client retention rates) as compared to the original Hatch
model? What factors affect membership dynamics, and to what
degree do they affect loan-size growth rates?
.............................................................................
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5.

How does internal account lending affect average loan size (of
external loans)? What factors affect the degree of internal
account lending?

The intention here is not to assess the accuracy of the original
model, but rather to learn from the experiences and adaptations of
a number of organizations implementing village bank programs
since the model was introduced. Specifically, this study sought to
improve the understanding of village banking dynamics and identify
particularly influential factors affecting program performance over
time.
Box 1 summarizes the per borrower loan and savings projections
of the original Hatch model. Underlying the original model are a
number of basic assumptions:
•
First-cycle entrants will remain active borrowers for nine fourmonth cycles (three years).
•

Village banks will grow in size as new members, encouraged
by the example of others, join the program.

•

Clients will save 20% of their current loan size each cycle.
Loan sizes increase based on a formula of last loan plus accumulated savings (see Box 1).

•

Based on this formula, clients, primarily women, will borrow
a progression of loans starting at US$50 and reaching the
US$300 loan ceiling by the third year.
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•

The projected loan-size growth rate is 500% over a 28-month
period.

Methodology
Five nonprofit organizations, CARE, FINCA, Freedom from
Hunger, Women’s Opportunity Fund, and World Relief, all of
which are members of the Small Enterprise Education and
Promotion Network (SEEP) Poverty Lending Working Group, participated in the study. Each organization collected longitudinal
information from a sample of village banks in one or two of their
programs. Data were collected from a total of 26 village banks
(totaling more than 700 members) operating in Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras (two programs, one rural
and one urban), and Uganda. Still, the sampled programs represent
only one or two sites of the participating agencies’ larger program
portfolios. In recognition of the lag-time since data collection, and
to encourage openness and objectivity, programs are identified in
this paper only by geographic areas rather than by implementing
agency.
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Village bank records were sampled to provide information about
member loans, savings, internal borrowing, and participation for
selected loan cycles (first, third, fifth, and last completed loan
cycle), using a protocol originally developed by Freedom from
Hunger. In order to conduct a comparison of actual program
dynamics to the original Hatch model, the village banks in the
study needed to have reached a certain maturity (of six cycles).
Across all the village banks sampled, the last completed loan cycle
occurred on average approximately 35 months into the program.
This average was calculated across village banks at each program
level and then across the seven programs for a cumulative average.
In addition, because programs had different loan-cycle lengths (fouror six-month cycles), information is presented by number of
months in the program at the end of the loan cycle, as well as the
loan cycle number, for uniform comparison purposes.

Findings
The study explores five major factors found to affect loan-size
growth: loan policies and practices, village bank location, savings
policies, internal account policies, and membership dynamics.
The first section presents information on the pattern of actual loan
growth for the seven programs, relative to the original Hatch
model. Subsequent sections examine how policies, setting, and
membership dynamics were related to the loan growth rates in various programs.

Loan Growth Patterns
What is the actual pattern of per borrower loan growth versus the
Hatch model?
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On average, loan size across all seven programs did not stagnate,
but increased steadily, although at a rate lower than the original
Hatch model projections.
On average, the loan growth in Figure 1 shows a steady increase
across the seven programs, although at a rate less than the original
model. The original model projected that loan sizes would grow by
500% (from US$50 to US$300) over an approximately three-year
period. For the seven programs examined here, the average per borrower loan size grew by 280% (from US$62 to US$173) over a similar period. While the growth rate was not as dramatic as projected,
a pattern of loan-size stagnation is not evident since, on average, the
per borrower loan size continues to climb.

Diversity in Average Loan Sizes by Program
There was tremendous variability in average program loan growth
rates and patterns across the seven sampled programs.
The averages presented in Figure 1 mask the tremendous variability in loan-size growth across the seven programs. As seen in Figure
2, two of the seven programs actually experienced relatively rapid
and high loan growth rates (Uganda and Colombia). One program,
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Guatemala, had high loan growth but over a longer, four-year
period; one program had modest but steady growth (Burkina Faso);
three had relatively flat loan-size patterns (Honduras-urban,
Bolivia, and Honduras-rural).

1

Key Factors Influencing Loan Size
Village banking programs typically select a maximum initial loan
size and a loan-size ceiling beyond which individual clients cannot
borrow regardless of their length of time in the program. Programs
also have various formulas by which individual clients can become
eligible for larger loans. The specifics of the loan policies, as well as
ancillary services such as internal loans and savings, influence loansize growth rates. In addition, the commercial development and
opportunity in the program area can influence a borrower’s ability
to use larger loans. Finally, the membership dynamics of longerterm clients leaving the program and new members joining can also
serve to dampen loan-size growth rates.
In order to facilitate comparison of how program policies and context might influence loan growth rates, the seven programs in the
study were divided into three groups based on third-year average
individual loan-size data from each village bank (see Table 1). The
high-range category (with an average loan size of more than
US$200) consists of the Colombia and Uganda programs; the midrange category (with an average loan of close to US$150) consists of
Honduras-urban and Guatemala; the low-range category (with an
average loan of less than US$100) consists of Burkina Faso, Bolivia,
and Honduras-rural.
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Loan-Size Policies
If consistently applied, the initial loan-size ceilings reduce average
loan size, especially for programs with a large influx of new members joining after the first loan cycle.
In five of the seven programs, initial loan sizes are more than the
US$50 projected by the original model. The range of initial loan
sizes span from US$50 to US$80 across the programs. Therefore, it
is not surprising that most programs equal or exceed original model
projections in the early cycles. Also influential to loan growth rates
was whether the initial loan-size policy was applied to first-time
borrowers joining after the first loan cycle. Guatemala showed 35%
of new entrants in the last reported loan cycle receiving loans
greater than US$100—raising the overall average in later months.
Uganda, on the other hand, experienced a sharp drop in loan size,
partly because of a large influx of new borrowers. If consistently
applied, the initial loan-size policy can reduce the overall average
loan size of a program with a large influx of new members who have
smaller loans.
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Maximum Loan Size
Programs with average loan sizes closer to the amounts predicted by
the original Hatch model had approximately 30% of their clients
taking loans of more than US$300. Program loan ceilings in some
cases were nonexistent or were as high as US$1,000 per borrower.
Programs with the lowest average loans consistently applied a
US$300 loan ceiling.
The maximum loan size or loan ceiling policy was even more
influential to the patterns of loan-size growth in the sampled programs. A commonly applied definition for poverty lending is loans
of US$300 or less. While the original model assumes all loans will
be US$300 or less, the three programs with the highest average loan
sizes—Uganda, Colombia, and Guatemala—had loan-ceiling policies
well above this amount. Table 2 shows the loan-ceiling policy and
the percentage of clients in each program receiving loans above
US$300 by the fifth and last reported cycles. It is interesting to note
that in three of the seven programs (Uganda, Guatemala and
Honduras-urban), borrowers were allowed to take loans larger than
the program’s stated loan-ceiling policy.
The relatively sharp climb in loan size during the first 20 months
of the Uganda program is related to the fact that initially, the program applied no loan ceiling. The later introduction of a maximum
loan size of US$600 and a major decline in retention of original borrowers between the fifth and last reported cycles, contributed to a
decline in the average loan size after the 20th month.2 Still, it is
important to note that approximately 30% of the borrowers in the
fifth and last completed loan cycles took loans in excess of US$300.
Only three of the seven programs had a policy of limiting loans to
a maximum of US$300. The two programs that did consistently
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apply the US$300 poverty-lending ceiling—Honduras-rural and
Bolivia—also had the most modest program growth rates. The fact
that only two programs have a poverty-lending ceiling of US$300
begs the question whether a certain portion of the loan portfolio
must be allocated to nonpoverty lending in order to achieve the
original loan growth-rate projections.

Rural vs. Urban Location and Average Loan-Size Growth
The urban programs had an average loan size of US$205 at 28
months, as compared to only US$98 at 32 months for the three
rural programs. An urbanization trend is apparent in village banking worldwide as more programs move to urban and peri-urban centers in order to facilitate fast portfolio growth and expansion.
As might be expected, the level of commercial economic activity
in the program area appears to impact per borrower loan size. All
the village banks in the lowest average loan-size category by year
three were in rural areas (see Table 1). An urbanization trend is
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apparent in village banking worldwide as more programs move to
urban and peri-urban centers in order to facilitate fast portfolio
growth and expansion (Nelson, et al., 1996). The programs in the
study sample mirror this trend: approximately half of the sampled
village banks were located in urban or peri-urban areas.
The dampening effect that less vibrant economic activity can have
on loan size is even more evident among the rural banks in Bolivia
and Honduras; those in less commercially developed areas have
average loan amounts of 2.5 times less than those in more developed
areas (MkNelly & Stack, 1996). This disparity was evident in the
Honduras-rural program, where none of the four village banks sampled were located in a town.
Locating banks in areas with more economic or commercial activity results in faster loan-growth rates and higher average loans.
Rurally oriented programs face the double challenge of working
with clientele more costly to reach who may have lower or inconsistent credit needs. Of course, one of the original goals of village
banking programs was to provide rural households with improved
access to credit. An overemphasis on the need for rapid loan-growth
rates and financial sustainability are likely to shift the focus away
Volume 1 Number 1
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from the less profitable rural operations to areas with more active
economic development.

Savings
What is the savings rate in practice versus the original Hatch model?
Like average loan-size, savings rates fall short of the original Hatch
model by the third year. Perhaps more important than savings
requirements are the incentives inherent in savings policies, such as
access and return through dividends and interest.
Figure 3 illustrates that savings rates, like loan rates, fall short of
the original Hatch model by the third year. Since village bank programs no longer aim to “graduate,” there is less of an imperative to
require borrowers to save US$300 in order to replace their ninth
and final program loan. Still, most village bank programs link borrowers’ loan-size eligibility to the amount of savings they have on
deposit with their village bank. For this reason, it is possible that
clients’ ability or inability to save could act as a brake on loan-size
growth rates.
Table 3 groups programs by high, medium, and low average savings in year three. The Uganda program had the highest average savings per borrower (US$179), which at 28 months exceeded the
amount projected by the original Hatch model. It is interesting to
note that two of the programs in the highest savings grouping—
Bolivia and Honduras-urban—were categorized as low- to mid-range
in terms of average loan size. The Bolivia program, in particular,
had a high savings-to-loan ratio of 189%. Both the urban and rural
village banks in Honduras also had relatively high savings-to-loan
ratios approaching 100%.
In the original model, the savings-to-loan ratio was projected to be
nearly one-to-one by the eighth cycle, with savings at US$275 and
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the loan capped off at US$300. While most of the programs had relatively high savings-to-loan ratios (above 80%), those with the
smallest average loan sizes—Honduras-rural, Honduras-urban, and
Bolivia—are among the highest, at 96%, 99%, and 189%, respectively. These ratios indicate that many members can reach the point
where they could capitalize themselves and graduate from the program. Yet many clients continue to borrow because they value
building their savings while at the same time having access to credit.
Still, over time, these high savings to loan ratios might be expected
to lead to client dropout unless clients have liberal access to their
savings and they earn some return on their savings.
Savings requirements and policies linking loan-size eligibility to
savings do not hinder loan growth directly or even show close correlation to savings rates. However, restricted access to savings may
indirectly affect loan growth by causing member resignation.
Dividend payments based partly on borrowers’ savings and liberal
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access to internal loans is related to very high savings-to-loan ratios,
even when savings requirements are relatively small.
For the programs included in the study, the savings incentives
inherent in program policies were more influential to savings rates
than were the stated savings requirements. High internal account
access, along with guaranteed returns through dividends, culminated in high savings-to-loan ratios in those programs which offered
internal loans.

Internal Account Policies
Liberal internal lending policies did detract from external account
loan growth in three programs. This phenomenon was most evident
for programs in which external loan repayment installments were
included as part of the internal fund.
How does internal account lending affect the average loan size (of
the external account)?
Internal account loans were originally conceived as a source of
complementary short-term loans, which could serve consumption
and emergency needs or supplement external loan amounts for
those borrowers whose working capital needs exceeded the amount
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allowed by the program. In this scenario, the internal account does
not compete with the external account. The same is true when the
internal account is lent mainly to individuals outside the village
bank. The original long-range purpose of the internal account supplanting the external account through graduation is no longer followed. Therefore, programs are carefully examining their internal
account policies and the ways these policies will affect the program
goals of poverty alleviation and financial sustainability.
Figure 4 shows that internal account lending relative to external
borrowing was significant in only three programs—Bolivia,
Honduras-rural, and Guatemala. Among the programs surveyed,
unrestricted access to internal account loans seems to have detracted
from external-account activity, lowering external account loan size
(MkNelly & Stack, 1996). By the end of the third year in Bolivia,
the average internal loan was US$129, compared to the external
loan of US$82. Because members had ready access to internal, as
well as to external loans, a true picture of borrower demands for
and use of loan capital requires examination of the total amount of
loans borrowers took (internal plus external loans).
Comparing the average total loans (external plus internal) by program to the original Hatch model reveals an even more pronounced
pattern of loan growth rate over time. In Figure 2 and Table 1, the
external loan growth for the Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs
was relatively modest and flat, but the total loan amounts, US$211
and US$165 respectively, are much closer to the original model projections. The Guatemala program also had relatively active internal
borrowing and a total loan that was 40% greater than the average
program loan.
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Key Factors Affecting the Degree
of Internal Account Lending
Aspects of the internal account that borrowers find attractive are
instructive to village banking practitioners. In those programs
where internal and external loan terms differ, clients preferred the
lump sum rather than weekly repayment schedule. The requirements of weekly repayment and weekly meetings over time act as
disincentives to program participation and increased borrowing
from the external account.
The major factor affecting the degree of internal account lending
is the program policies dictating borrower access to internal loans.
There is considerable range in the internal loan policies. Two programs—Honduras-urban

and

Burkina

Faso—allowed

no

internal

account lending. At the other extreme, the Bolivia and Hondurasrural programs allowed unrestricted lending of the internal account,
which included repayment installments on the external loans. The
Guatemala program also allowed unrestricted internal lending of
member
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installments. The Colombia and Uganda programs had more restrictive and less flexible internal loan policies.
The relatively high internal loan amounts seen in the Bolivia and
Honduras-rural programs can also be explained by the fact that only
with these two programs did the external loan payments flow
through the internal account. This blending of external payments
into the internal account is the main distinguishing factor behind
the high internal account rates of Honduras-rural and Bolivia.
The programs with more active internal lending also offered terms
different from external loans, which terms borrowers found attractive. The Bolivia, Honduras-rural, and Guatemala programs all
allowed borrowers to repay their internal loans (principal plus
interest) in a lump sum rather than in regular weekly installments.
Borrowers also appreciated the fact that the interest they paid on
internal loans accrued to the village bank itself and was paid out to
members as dividends.
Due to restrictive internal-account policies, programs such as
Uganda and Colombia had little internal-account lending. The
Uganda program required a 30% cash reserve, forbade internal lending until the third cycle, and limited internal lending to 5% of the
external loan amount. The Colombia program limited the amount
of internal lending allowed, with greater emphasis on lending to
nonembers than members. In addition, the internal account terms
were similar to those of the external loans, in that weekly repayment
was required and a limit was put on the amount that could be lent.

Participation Rates
Sustained borrowers make up only 65% of the membership by the
end of the first year, approximately 50% by the end of the second
year, and only 35% by the end of the third year. Inconsistent borVolume 1 Number 1
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rowing and late joiners dampen loan-size growth. The average loan
size of sustained borrowers was approximately 25% higher than the
loan-size averages for the general village bank membership at the
end of the third year.
What are the membership dynamics in practice as compared to the
original Hatch model? The Hatch model projects that membership
starts at approximately 30 and increases to no more than 50 after the
first few cycles (Hatch, 1989). While it is expected that new members will join in later cycles, the model does not account for the
financial implications of original members leaving the program.
Figure 5 illustrates the actual membership dynamics by comparing
the average number of active borrowers per village bank to the average number of borrowers sustained from the first to the last completed loan cycles. Average membership per bank remains at
approximately 28, while the number of sustained borrowers who
joined in the first cycle decreases to 10, or about one-third of the
original membership, by month 35.
By the end of the first year, 65% of the first-cycle borrowers were
still active in their village banks and had consistently borrowed in
each of the first three loan cycles. Near the end of year two, 53% of
the borrowers had consistently borrowed since the first loan cycle.
This number dropped to 35% by the end of year three. It is not possible to say whether these numbers represent relatively high or low
rates of sustained borrowing as compared to other credit methodologies, because little empirical evidence is available to make such a
comparison. In any case, these membership dynamics run counter
to the original model’s assumption that clients will demand steadily
increasing loans every four to six months over a three-year period.
The most dramatic exit of first-cycle borrowers occurs in the village bank’s first year. One theory behind this fact is that the first
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three cycles are a period of “weeding out,” as clients come to better
understand the requirements of the system and the premium placed
on on-time repayment. Members with other options for acquiring
working capital, perhaps the wealthier members, may decide to
resign completely or suspend loans temporarily. Despite this lack of
consistent clientele, overall program loan growth rates do show
steady increases for most of the programs.
The number of members joining after the first cycle is also dramatic. By the end of the first year, 35% of the active borrowers had
joined after the first loan cycle. As the village banks approach the
end of their second year, the percentage of borrowers who joined
after the first loan cycle rises to 54%, and to a little more than 70%
by the end of year three. This phenomenon of late joiners is consistent with Hatch’s original theory that those more risk-averse (usually the very poor) will join after having the opportunity to observe
the program for some time. The risk takers (usually those with
more income) tend to join first, but they also leave more quickly if
the requirements of the village bank are too taxing on their time.
Discussions with late joiners in the Honduras-rural program
revealed that some had not heard about the program, some did not
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join at the time because they had young children, and others were
afraid to join because they did not fully understand how the program worked or they were hesitant to assume a loan.
Also evident in the data were those individuals who enter and exit
the program numerous times for various reasons. Some of these
individuals joined as of the first loan cycle, left in a later cycle, and
then rejoined. Others joined after the first loan cycle and followed
a similar pattern of leaving and returning in later cycles. These
intermittent borrowers represented only approximately 10% of the
entire sample, and therefore did not have a significant effect on the
overall trends. However, this dynamic of suspending borrowing for
one or more cycles at a time does have programmatic implications.
Practitioners should be aware of this element in planning projections, and program loan policies should accommodate inconsistent
borrowing while not penalizing the member.
The dropout of longer-term consistent borrowers and the drop-in
of new borrowers both have the same effect—a reduction in average
loan size. First-time borrowers commonly start at the initial maximum loan size, which averages US$62. Thus, a program with a low
resignation rate but a high late joiner or drop-in rate will also experience a dampening of average loan-size growth. Figure 6 plots the
average loan size of sustained borrowers, relative to that of all borrowers as well as to the original Hatch model projections. By the
end of year three, the sustained borrowers’ average loan size was
US$218 as compared to US$173 for all borrowers, and was 73% of
the model projection as compared to only 60% for all borrowers.
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Sustained Participation and Average Loan Size
Among Individual Programs
The program with the highest sustained borrower rate (Guatemala)
had relatively flexible program policies—high loan ceilings, liberal
access to internal loans, and lump-sum rather than weekly repayment—that may have been sufficient incentive to keep borrowers
active in the program.
If client drop-out was a major cause for slow loan-growth rates,
programs with high rates of sustained borrowing should have relatively high average loan sizes. However, this relationship was not
consistently found among the programs included in the study.
Programs in Colombia, Guatemala, and Burkina Faso had the highest retention rate (40% or higher) of first-cycle borrowers in the
third year of operation. These programs represented all three different average loan-size categories: high (Colombia), medium
(Guatemala), and low (Burkina Faso).3 Those with the lowest retention rate, Honduras-rural and Bolivia (30% and 17% respectively),
show higher savings rates and relatively low program loans but
midrange total loan amounts.
Guatemala had the highest retention rate of sustained borrowers
at month 30 (67%). Its relatively high loan ceilings, liberal access to
internal account lending, and more flexible repayment requirements
may have been sufficient incentive to keep borrowers active in the
program. The Guatemala program allowed borrowers to repay program loans in lump sum payments at the end of the loan cycle rather
than weekly. After the fifth loan cycle, required meetings are
biweekly rather than weekly. In addition, refresher training is given
periodically in Guatemala regarding bank regulations that may also
contribute to higher sustained participation.
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In Burkina Faso, the program’s initial policy of graduating village
banks after the ninth loan cycle may have contributed to a relatively high drop-out rate toward the end of year three. Colombia’s
retention rate, 48% in month 24, was close to the overall average of
53% in month 22. It is difficult to tell if this trend would have continued into the third year because later data are unavailable.

Causes of Resignation
Resignations are attributed to factors both internal and external to
program policy and practice. External factors include migration, illness, and inconsistent economic activity. Early-cycle resignation is
more tied to lack of compliance with group regulations, whereas
late-cycle resignation is linked with inconvenience of weekly meetings and limited savings access.
Several of the programs participating in the study conducted
informal discussion groups with staff and clients on the major reasons why clients leave the village bank programs. 4 Based on this
feedback, the following factors were the most common causes of
resignation.
1.

Expulsion by fellow members for delinquency or default. This
group includes members who did not fully appreciate the regulations when they joined, and consequently resigned early.
This may be one reason behind the rapid reduction in sustained membership (35%) between the first and third cycles.

2.

Seasonality, migration, or poor market or economic activity.
Inconsistent commercial or economic activity was cited in four
out of seven programs as causing resignation or, more often,
intermittent borrowing.

3.

Dissatisfaction with weekly payments. Not only did borrowers see weekly meetings and payments as time-consuming, but
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the meetings also reduced the amount of time borrowers had
to use the loan as working capital, and increased the real interest rate of loans.
4.

Access to savings. Savings access only through the internal
account, which was limited in some programs, coupled with
no return shown in some programs, appeared to be a disincentive for continued participation. This was especially true in the
later cycles when savings amounts were more significant.

5.

Illness. Health problems often caused members to leave the
program or to halt borrowing temporarily.

Many of the causes behind resignation are outside program control and influence. Still, program policies can influence borrower
incentives to remain or to leave the program. Policies regarding earlier orientation and training are likely to have a greater effect on the
early dropouts, while greater programmatic flexibility will affect
the later-cycle member withdrawals.
Strategies that may increase loan size by increasing the sustained
participation of members include better orientation and follow-up
on regulations, reduced frequency of meetings and repayment
installment, more flexibility with inconsistent borrowing, and an
increase in savings access.

Conclusions
The experiences of these seven programs indicate that village banking clients are able to absorb loans of increasing size. In general,
average loan sizes, especially for sustained borrowers, do not stagnate at least for the first two to four years. When trends in average
total loans (external plus internal loans) are considered, six of the
seven programs exhibit patterns of variable but steady growth.
Although loan growth rates were slower than the 500% projected
Volume 1 Number 1

113

Journal of Microfinance
by the original Hatch model, average loan sizes do increase on average by 280% over an approximately three-year period. Without
comparable empirical data, it is not possible to say whether this represents relatively high or low growth rates relative to other credit
methodologies. The variability in loan growth rates for the seven
programs provides useful insight into the effect of various policies,
services, membership dynamics, and context on loan growth rates:
•

The Guatemala village banks demonstrated the most pronounced loan growth rates, perhaps in part due to their relatively longer program experience. But this good growth is also
likely explained by the program’s relatively flexible policies—
longer loan period, less-frequent repayment installments,
access to internal funds, and relatively high loan ceilings—and
its subsequently high rates of sustained client participation.

•

The Uganda program started off in its first two years with very
rapidly escalating loan growth rates, partly because no loan
ceilings were applied and some borrowers take relatively large
loans. However, this period of rapid growth is followed by a
decline in loan size when more restrictive policies, such as loan
ceilings, were put in place to better control loan-size growth
and repayment problems. These problems and new policies
were associated with major membership turnover, which
dampens average loan size.

•

The Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs are examples of the
dampening effect that unrestricted internal borrowing can
have on external loan growth rates.

•

The village banks from the Burkina Faso program illustrate
how the anticipation of graduation with its cessation of program services can lead to relatively high rates of program exit.
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The fact that poverty-lending programs usually cater to lowincome women, often mothers, indicates that the clientele profile
does not lend itself to rapid loan growth at the proposed rate of the
original model. Instead, this profile shows steady but modest loan
increases. Time frames for expected self-sufficiency may be skewed,
given client demand for loans. Although an examination of each
programs’ financial sustainability performance on the relationship
to loan-size growth rates is outside the scope of this study, it should
be considered for further review. As the pressures for sustainability
increase, so will the challenges for practitioners to continue to
evolve and innovate village bank programs to serve this clientele
with programs that are financially and institutionally sustainable.

Notes
1.

The Bolivia and Honduras-rural programs show a much more dramatic
increase in loan size when the total borrowing (external plus internal
loans) is taken into account (see Figure 6).

2.

3.
4.

The Uganda program also changed its loan eligibility formula from the
original model’s last loan plus total savings to first loan plus total savings
in an effort to better control loan amounts following a period of repayment problems.
As mentioned earlier, the devaluation of the FCFA in Burkina Faso deflates
the dollar average loan size.
Feedback from programs was not uniformly gathered on this issue. In
addition, the discussions were conducted primarily with current clients
rather than with members who had left the program.
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